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POINT &COUNTERPOINT 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
By Deborah A. Geie~ and Maxine AaronsonAscrlcs of recent and contro­versial cases has raised the b~uc nf hnw plaintiffs tnust treat attnrnc.y fees and 
costs that arc paid om of 
otherwise indudable set­
tlement or litigation awards. 
Point: Only Congress can cre­
ate deductions. In these cases, 
plaintiffs contended thm the ponion 
of the award paid to the attorneys is 
"cxdudahlc" hy rhem in the first 
place. The plaintiffs made three 
argurncnrs, the first two of which 
can he raised only if the contract 
wilh the allomcy L~ of a contlngcm­
fcc nature. First, plaintiffs argue that 
they have assignrd rhcir property 
rights to a portion of the recovery 
equal to their attornq lees and 
costs because they gave up control 
over that portion of their recovery 
under the comingem fee comract. 
Second, they argue that the Old 
gross-income doctrine docs not fit 
the problem at hand and can allow 
inappropriate "deduction" of nonde­
ductible capital cxpenditurrs. 
One rejoinder deals \\~th the only 
argument that would apply equally 
to contingent-fee contmcts and 
other hourly contmw;: the existence 
of swte attornr>' lien &tatmcs. What 
about p:1ymcnts to allorncys in 
states in which 1herc is no simihu 
statute or in which the stat\llc cre­
ates for the attorneys only a security 
interest in the reco\•ery? Most del'en­
dants pay contingent-fee awards 
directly to the nust account of the 
plaintiffS attomcys, so the statute 
has little effect other than to make 
some plaintiffs pay tax on gross 
a\wrds while others pay tax on onl}' 
the net awanls. 
With respect lo the arguments 
applicable only in the cases Involving 
contingent-fee contracts, what about 
by reference to the gross rccovety 
under the lmvsuil. 
The fact that the. assignment-of. 
income cases arose in the family con­
text, and that only the donor or 
donec, but not both, were taxed does 
not mean th~n attempted "assign­
me111s" of income should hr. ll'$pect­
ed oUlside those contexts. Sometimes 
both should be taxed, and taxation of 
rhc assignor should not be allowed to 
be evaded hy disthigulshing away the 
:L'\5ignmcm-of-lncomc doctrine. This 
point is illustrntcd in llayli11 v. IJ11ltecl 
S1<1tcs, which dc111onstmtcs that ii 
might m)t be <I good idea In allow ull 
litigants to exclude the portion of an 
av.-ard equal to the amount paid to I.he 
attorneys under any of these theories. 
In !Joyll11, a pmtnership chal­
lenged a $4 million valuation of 
property seized by the stntc under 
its condcmm1tion power. The part­
nership entered into a contingent­
'' 
The court concluded that this method of repayment 
places taxpayer's funds at risk. 
''Colony TillSt doctrine does not 
apply because, under the contin­
gent-fee contract, plaintiffs had no 
obligotion to po}' the mtomcys for 
their services. Third, they argue 
that, becnuse attorney lien statutes 
can give the :morncys a p1ior right 
to the portion of any recovery equal 
to fees and costs owed to them, the 
attomers "own" this ponlon of the 
award from the beginning. 
The rejoinders illustmte thm the 
Oebomlt A. Geier Is a law professor at 
Cleveland-Marshall College ofLaw, 
Clet'eland, Ohio. Maxine Aaronson is a 
solo praclftioner In Dallas, Texas. 
fees paid under the occasional 
hourly or llat-ratc contract? It should 
make no difference how the fee pay­
ment is strncmred; t11e fees should 
be fully deductible in any event. 
With respect to contingent-fee con­
tracts themselves, it is not cll'ar !hat 
they opcr.llc to "assiJln" a portion of 
assignable "property" income, or that 
plaintiffs have no obligation to "pay" 
the attorneys under a contingent-fee 
contract. It is just as reasonable to 
argue that the relutionship bc1wcc11 
the parties is that of senice red pient 
to scn~cc provider, and that \he 
plaintiffs simply a!\recd to mc:isure 
the worth of their attorneys' services 
fee contract under which its attor­
ney would receive a percentage of 
any increase obtained over the pre­
vious valuation. The purtics settled 
i1t a valuation of more than $16 mil­
lion. The fee, if nor excludablc h>• 
the partnership, would not be ron­
sidered a deductible e:.:pense but, 
rather, a nondeductible capital 
expenditure pertaining to the con­
demned property, reducing the 
amount of c11pital gain realized by 
the partnership. The courl n•jcctrd 
:m exclusion, rnnduding that the 
assignment-of-income doctrine pre· 
(Continued on page 84) 
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vents it and thlll the presence of an 
al 1ornc;• lien stotute does not change 
the t't'_~ull. 
The ca;c demonstrates why this 
b'tll' is properly t1 deduction issue, 
and tlrnt relief for the appropriate 
r:1scs slrnuld he lcgisbtcd on the 
d1:<luc:Lion side of the ledger. Trying 
10 resolve the problem favorably for 
1he sympathetic class in this manner 
rnn wreak havnc in a case such <1S 
Bayli11, when: 1he ta.xp:iycr would 
effectively be allowc:tl 10 deduct a 
nonclccluctiblc capital elqJcnditurc. 
Counterpoint: let's not forget 
the forest while examining the 
trees. Virtually no one actually 
bt'.licves that it is approp1ia1e or 
good tax policy lo fail lo allow some 
sort ul c:rcdit for mtorncy fees 
against 1hc alt~rrnllive minimum tax 
(A\>IT). My favorite illustrath•e case 
is Farnglwr \~ City of Born Raw11, 
whic:h was a sexual harnss111cnt CH5C 
clarilying that employers Giil be \ic­
ariously liable for 1hc actions of their 
employees. Plairniff was awarded 
one dollar in actual damages and 
recovered her allurncy fees, which 
reportedly nm some $325,000. 
Does anyone rrally think that Ms. 
F:1mghar should bl'. prMlcged to pay 
more rhan $80,000 in taxes out of 
her own pocket for having the 
courage to pursue what was dearly 
unple:is.1nt, b1.1t important, litiga­
tion? 
The AMT was otiginally passed 
to deal with a small number of very 
wealthy indi,,iduals who were 1x1y­
ing little or no t:~x. Disalklwing any 
offset or a\low:.utcc for attonwy fw; 
simply docs not bit the "target mar­
ket" of the AMT. lns1cad, il penalizes 
mitldlc-cbss taxpayers who collect 
taxable. damages for oncc-1ri-.1-lifc­
time events as recompense for an 
occurrence that most taxpayers 
wnuld just as soon not repe<tt, 
regdrcllcss of the net economic gain. 
II the purpose ol tlie /\MT f.o; to influ­
ence the behavior of taxpayers who 
1.1se certain deductions on u recur­
ring basis, then the position of the 
IRS pcni11i1cs the innocent while 
missing the real target. The debate is 
about what to do aboul it, and who 
can do it. Professor Gt:ier believes 
that the solution must come from 
Congress I: ~cause she ;iews the 
issue as a deduction issue. Clearly. 
her solution is one wily to solve the 
problem. But is it the only way? 
Some couns take the view that the 
attorney fee ponic.n is never the 
incnmc of the litig;inr to begin with. 
Therefore, it is not includablc under 
§ 61, and a rorrcsponcling offacuing 
deduction is not necessary The fact 
that this theory nearly s1dcs1eps the 
mismatch of mcomc and expense 
under the AMT is not a reason to 
discMd it, if it is othcrwf;c justifi­
able. 
Stt')1ping back from the specific 
problem and analyzini; the "eco­
nomic deal" between the pilrtlcs is 
often uscfol in tax matters, where 
substance trittmph5 over form. 
What lhcn 1,; the economic deal 
between lawyer and c.licnt in a trndi­
tional contingency fee arrangement? 
At its most basic. a 1raditi01ml con­
tingency fee arrangement is a trans­
fer of an economic interest in the 
end product in cxc:hangc for scn~ces 
necessary to prnducc ihc encl result.. 
On what theory should one party 
have 10 rcporl as p;ross income 100 
percent of the product, and the occ­
ond pmty report a portion as well? 
Section 61 defines income broadly, 
but no su broad.ly as to include pick­
ing up the income or anot her. 
A typical attorney contingency 
fee contrnct tnmsfcrs 1111 interest m 
prnp1~r1y if considerntion is present. 
The mlornrys lien i:,;.~ue is a red her­
rinf!,. as is the argu1ncnt that the 
attorney c:mrwt pwcccd wit hnm 1hr. 
client's consent. Tlw rules in this 
area exist to avoid the common law 
crime or b.irralry, not to determine 
and guide the tax consequences of 
the transaction. The reality is no dif­
ferent from that involving the shnrc­
croppcr. rommcrcial fisherman, 
vcmling machi11c 0\\11rr, or mineral 
lease. Neither party can proceed 
withom something from the other-­
and that is the essence of a joint ven­
ture. which may or may not he a 
"partnership" for t:Lx purposes. 
Fmally, the issue of bring able to 
somehow drduct a nondeductible 
capital expense rniscd by Professor 
Geier should be addressed. 
Damages for destmclion of capital 
assets arc capital in n;iturc. Under 
the origin of the claim thco1y, a 
deemed sulc or exchange occurs and 
the capitalized expense is taken into 
acrnunt at the timl' of payment. 
C1pitalizccl expenses arc, in rlfrct, 
netted out at the time of disposition 
of the capital asset. The underl>ing 
litigation in Daylln was a condcmna· 
tion case. Sculcmcnt of the matter, 
whrtlw.r at the rnunhouse nr hernrc 
trial, dfecled ei1h~r a partial or com­
plete disposition of the ::lSSel, since 
the settlement fixed the amount 
realized in exchange for the proper­
ty taken. in:rJ11 
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